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Abstract—This paper introduces two novel control solutions,
which allow localised delay compensation for grid-connected and
standalone inverters. As the prediction horizon of the existing
controllers are quite small as compared to large communication
delays and information unavailability due to denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks, the proposed strategy offers a robust delay
mitigation range using localized dynamics. Its design philosophy
is leveraged via a prediction policy using the inner control
loop dynamics. Based on different control objectives in grid-
connected and standalone mode, the proposed solutions have
been augmented into the control system accordingly. Finally, its
robustness under various communication delay and DoS attacks
have been tested.
Index Terms—Denial-of-service, hierarchical control, mitiga-
tion, inverter, communication network
I. INTRODUCTION
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks is among the well-discussed
cyber attacks on hierarchical controllers of distributed energy
resources (DERs) in connection with the electrical grid [1].
Such attacks are characterized by affecting the availability of
the information on the communication layer [2]. However, it
is in the physical layer where the effects of such attacks are
essentially noticed.
DoS-type cyber attacks are notorious for being simple to
perform and difficult to detect in their initial states [3]. This
inherent characteristic, however, is highly noticeable depend-
ing on the number of nodes and the degree of distribution of
the communication network. The complexity of the communi-
cation framework in DERs is intrinsically linked to the number
of inverter modules, the number of communication nodes, and
the amount of exchanged information [4]. Therefore, as the
number of control layers, inverter systems operating in paral-
lel, and the number of smart meters increase, the complexity of
the communication system also increases. Hence, DoS attack
can be easily conducted without being detected.
In cyber-physical systems of DERs, the quality of the energy
delivered depends directly on unbiased sharing of information
between the control agents. Hierarchical control systems are
generally designed to meet different requirements of the power
grid. However, the functions of the controllers vary depending
on the architecture of the electrical network and how they
are connected to it [5]. Thus, the effects of a DoS attack on
the communication of such systems may degrade the delivered
power and may pronounce into instability later [6]. Regardless
of the variables affected, the effects of the cyberattack are
linked to the nature of the connection of the DERs to the
power grid. Strictly speaking, if the DERs are tied to the power
grid, the hierarchical control structure works differently than
a system islanded from the grid. Likewise, the effects of a
cyberattack on the communication network in grid-tied DER
systems are different from the effects of similar intrusions on
an isolated electrical network.
To deal with DoS attacks with prohibited information,
current research efforts focus on three categories: (a) by in-
vestigating the methodology for the attack and challenges [7];
(b) on techniques for detection of such occurrences [8], [9];
(b) and mitigating strategies to remove such attacks [10], [11].
The resilient operation of the control system has been studied
for DERs connected to the grid or operating in standalone
mode [12], [13]. However, due to the different nature of the
structures, there is still a lack of work that shows a resilient
operation for both frameworks. Taking that into account, this
work aims to show robust strategies that mitigate the delay of
DoS attack effects in both architectures.
Since the cyber intricacies can be stochastic in nature, a
rapid delay mitigation technique can be an efficient solution
to handle the said issue. This paper proposes the use of event-
triggering techniques to detect an abnormal delayed response
in the communication system. Thus, if a limit is violated, a
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new control action is requested from the proposed controllers
to mitigate the effects of the attack until normal operation is
resumed.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND REVIEW
The cyber layer, in intelligent power generation systems,
guarantees the functioning of the system within the standards
established by the power grid operator. The cyber layer
comprehends the control algorithms, the calculation of the
data, and the exchange of information by the communication
networks. All of these parts command, together, the physical
layer to ensure that the energy is effectively delivered to the
load. Howbeit, both the communication and the concentration
of data in the controllers make the system vulnerable to cyber-
attacks [14].
The communication interfaces of the cyber layer send and
receive messages under a periodic time-lapse. This commu-
nication delay, also called latency, indirectly influences the
processing of data by control agents. In terms of control,
studies have already shown that, depending on its size, the
communication delay has a greater impact on the dynamic
response of DER systems [15], [16]. Taking this into account,
delays maliciously inserted into the communication network
of smart grids aim to exploit this effect.
In hierarchical controllers, which relates to both systems
studied in this work, the most internal control loops generally
have higher bandwidth and are closer to electrical devices.
Local controllers are generally distributed and are highly
dependent on aggregated or centralized control agents at
higher levels. Higher-level controllers usually send references
to be followed by the local controller. Thus, a distortion of
the information received by the local controller might have a
critical effect on the output response of the system.
Therefore, in this work, for both scenarios considered,
assume a time-varying heterogeneous delay in communication
network described by τd . Also, assume that the delay attacks
variables on the secondary controller. This control layer works
on trajectory correction of the references received by the local




x [t] if t ∈ [0, tA)
x [t− τd ] if t > tA
(1)
where tA is the time instant when the attack happens.
It is evident that without a strategy aimed at mitigating
the delay, the primary controller would be completely inert
and will be unable to compensate for the distorted reference
signal. Besides, without an attack detection strategy, the local
controller would still be operating under the imposed con-
ditions. Yet, the primary controller is usually the one with
the highest bandwidth and highest processing speed [17]. This
control layer could clearly take much faster actions than the
others to mitigate the attack. However, to do so, the primary
controller needs to leave its role as a slave control agent to
take an active role in the countermeasure process against the
DoS attack. This is one of the main ideas from this work and
the next sections will present strategies to mitigate the delay
in this regard.
III. PROPOSED CONTROL STRATEGIES
The strategies to mitigate DoS cyber attacks proposed in this
article have characteristics in common. Both are event-driven
and have adaptive control mechanisms to alter the control
conditions during DoS cyber attacks. Fig. 1 gives a conceptual
view of how the event-triggering system would work. Once the
communication might be compromised, resilient architectures
must have monitoring device systems that, by comparison,
should have a metric to identify abnormal behavior. For
example, the time lapse for information to arrive or loss of
data packets are a clear indication that the system does not
behave as expected. Therefore, in this section, alternatives for
























Fig. 1: Schematic of an event-trigger action for the local
controller
A. Mitigation of the delay in grid-tied inverter system
The DERs connected to the mains power grid works accord-
ingly as per the commands of a central controller. Since these
systems operate in grid-following mode, the variables depend
on the voltage and frequency imposed by the electrical net-
work. Still, from a distributed point of view, when these sys-
tems operate far from the power grid, there are line impedances
between the inverter output and PCC. These impedances
cannot be overlooked in the energy delivery process. Taking
this into account, the secondary controllers play the role of
adjusting the voltage drop and the phase difference for accurate
reference tracking. However, if the adjustment values sent by
the secondary controller are delivered incorrectly, the system
will suffer an imbalance in the supplied energy. Considering
this scenario, an attack mitigation strategy is proposed after
the identification of the abnormal behavior and evaluating the
convergence of the delivered power within a threshold. Then,
assuming a control law for the triggering mechanism such that
γ f lag = 1 ⇐⇒ {‖yREF [t]− yd [t̄]‖2 > δ | τi}
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Fig. 2: Schematic of the proposed control strategy for standalone inverters to provide resilience against communication delay –
the event-driven strategy adapts the control to estimate voltage on the PCC by Virtual Impedance instead of using the secondary
controller during the DoS attack.
where δ is a tolerated threshold within the system can operate,
and ai and bi define the time interval condition that needs to
be attended for the response to be considered normal.
Thus, to mitigate DoS attacks on the system’s communi-
cation network, this work uses a strategy based on the use
of a virtual impedance internal to the primary controller.
The method temporarily deflects the signal sent by the sec-
ondary controller when estimating the voltage, using a virtual
impedance instead. Fig. 2 shows the complete control system
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Fig. 3: Comparison of the waveforms of active and reactive
power delivered to PCC after half-load step, between nominal
condition (PNOM and QNOM) and during a DoS attack of 1.25s
(PDoS and QDos).
impedance is done in a static manner, in α/β components,
based on the measurements of the voltage and current after
the inverter output filter such that
ePCC,α [t] =−RV I · iL,α [t]−XLV I · iL,α + eINV [t] (3)
ePCC,β [t] =−RV I · iL,β [t]−XLV I · iL,β + eINV [t] (4)
Fig. 3 shows some results of the system operating nominally
and under the effect of the DoS attack when no protective
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the waveforms of active and reactive
power delivered to PCC after half-load step, during a 1.25s
DoS attack and when the virtual impedance takes part after
the cyber attack detection (PV I and QV I).
impedance strategy on the primary controller is verified as
soon as the abnormality in the system is detected. The attack
was induced in the phase shift variable sent by the secondary
controller. In this condition, the degradation due to the DoS
attack is perceived mainly in the reactive power delivered to
the PCC. Thus, comparing the results in the two figures, it
shows that the strategy can effectively reduce the effects of
the attack verified in the output power.
The strategy using virtual impedance is a temporary alter-
native and should not meet the control methodology at all
times. Due to the distributed nature of the DER system, the
choice of impedance values would need to be well chosen and,
even so, could produce an undesirable static error in the active
power delivered. This last fact justifies the use of the secondary
controller in a normal situation. However, it is efficient to
mitigate the effects of the degradation of the delivered energy
in a short period of time. Hence, giving time for the operator
to take any action to restore the system.
B. Mitigation of the delay in isolated network
An example of the system (shown in Fig. 5) with N
standalone inverters is considered here, which communicate
with each other using a cooperative cyber graph. All DGs are
interconnected with each other via tie-line parameters given
by Ri j and Li j to achieve proportionate active power and
reactive sharing. The delayed measurements x(t−τd) mandate
prediction of their position in the future. Since the timescale of
operation of the secondary controller is generally in seconds,
a delay exceeding the predefined limits in this range will lead
to oscillatory instability due to continually missed updates and
will consequently compromise its performance. This mandates
the need of a delay mitigation strategy to compensate for the
communication delay between multiple DGs. To minimize the
dependence on these factors, this paper firstly exploits the
PI consensusability law [18] to predicate the response of the
active and reactive control layer in the presence of a distur-
bance. As the delay compensation occurs in the secondary
layer, the corresponding error signals evdi (t) and e
vq
i (t) prior
to the voltage control loop is firstly downsampled to edi (t) and











where h[b] is an impulse response with B as the window length
and D being the downsampling factor. It is worth notifying that
downsampling is a common resampling tool, which decimates
the input signal by D sample to reduce the resolution. It is
often carried out to decrease the memory requirements. In this
context, it is carried out to match the dynamic performance
of the error quantities prior to the voltage control loop evdi ,
evqi and the error prior to the secondary controller uk. This
step is mandated to synchronize the abovementioned signals
due to the multi-time scale property. A pictorial description
of the downsampling operation is provided in Fig. 6, where
eVolt is downsampled into two output signals, where the new
resolution is scaled by two values of D, i.e, 2 and 4.
To affirm the presence of large and random delays, the
downsampled signals in ’(5) and (6) are compared with the
local cooperative inputs upi (t) and u
q
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Fig. 5: Schematic of the proposed control strategy for standalone inverters to provide resilience against communication delay –
the prediction policy provides a decisive input if the down-sampled input can be used. The down-sampling input can be tuned
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Fig. 6: Downsampling of {evd ,evq} into a decimated output
{ed ,eq}, respectively – Higher the value of the scaling factor
D, its resolution keeps decreasing.
After this stage, the prediction policy operates to reconstruct
the final delay compensation signals in ei(tk) = {epi (tk),e
q
i (tk)}






Finally, this error is then fed into the prediction policy stage;
which reconstructs another signal to compensate for large
delays. Hence, the prediction policy condition can be given
by
||ei(tk)|| ≥ α||exp(−t/T )edqi || (8)




i ], α is a tunable parameter and T (=Kp/Ki)
is the controller time constant of H1(s) and H2(s) PI control
loop. Finally, if the condition in (8) is satisfied, then it gener-
ates triggers. These triggers are then used to reconstruct ek(tk)
using a Sample and Hold block with tk as the triggering
instant. Finally, the reconstructed signals in ereconstructi (tk),
acting as the delay compensating signals, are fed back into
the secondary voltage control loop via tunable gains k1 and
k2, respectively. These model-free predicted inputs are given
by
edel pi (tk) = k1e
reconstruct p
i (tk) (9)
edelqi (tk) = k2e
reconstructq
i (tk) (10)





nally, as shown in Fig. 5, these inputs are added back into
the control inputs of the secondary controller using:










where, up fi and u
q f
i are the final secondary control inputs
designed using the proposed prediction policy. The efficacy
to handle large delays can be accounted specifically to the
prediction policy; where the error calculation stage validates an
interruption in updated information. As a result, the prediction
horizon due to the proposed strategy becomes much larger
compared to the existing approaches.
In the system outlined in Fig. 5 with N = 4 standalone paral-
lel inverters, the performance of the proposed delay mitigation
technique is evaluated under a maximum communication delay
of 0.65 sec in Fig. 7. In Fig. 7(a), the performance of the
parallel controllers is affected when a DoS attack is conducted
on the incoming communication links of DG I. As a result, the



































































(a) without the proposed controller

















































(b) in the presence of proposed controller
Fig. 7: Performance of N = 4 standalone inverters under
a communication delay of 0.65 sec when a DoS attack is
conducted at t = 1s
primary response is followed which leads to drop in frequency
following the loss of spanning tree connectivity. However,
with the increase in load, the system becomes unstable due
to oscillating active and reactive power. However, due to
the proposed robust prediction policy, the performance in
attaining proportionate active and reactive power sharing is
significantly improved for the same communication delay even
for DoS attacks. This improvement can be attributed to the
reconstructed signals edi (tk) and e
q
i (tk) for every disturbance.
Fig. 8: Performance of N = 4 standalone inverters under a
communication delay of 0.8 sec and 30% data packet loss
when a DoS attack is conducted at t = 1.5 sec.
As soon as the error calculation formalizes that a large delay is
prohibiting the next update of measurements, the reconstructed
signals using the proposed delay mitigation controller restore
consensus between each signal.
In the same system with N = 4 standalone DGs, the perfor-
mance of the proposed delay mitigation strategy is tested in
Fig. 8 under a large communication delay of 0.8 sec alongside
30% data packet loss in the communication channel between
two DGs. Furthermore, a large signal disturbance in the form
of plug and play capability of a DG is performed to test the
operational reliability when one of the DGs is plugged out. It
can be seen in Fig. 8 that despite the presence of large delay,
the proposed prediction policy ensures a formidable response,
which allows proportionate active power sharing when DG II
is plugged out. Furthermore when DG II is plugged in, all
standalone inverters resume sharing equally. It can also be
seen that the reactive power is proportionately shared without
any seemingly steady-state convergence problems.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper proposes two novel delay mitigation strate-
gies to handle communication delays due to DoS attacks in
networked systems for grid-connected and islanded parallel
inverters by reconstructing a compensating signal locally. For
the grid following inverter, this article proposes an adaptive
control strategy, triggered by an attack identification event,
to temporarily replace the conventional control and reduce
the degradation of the energy supplied to the grid. Whereas
for the grid-forming inverter, an event-based reconstructed
downsampled signal is used to provide resilience against large
delays.
It intends to show that different strategies are necessary to
deal with communication delays due to attacks in the control
system, depending on the architecture of the DERs in relation
to the network. Resilient control systems have characteristics
and peculiarities intrinsically related to the physical layer.
Therefore, there is no single design methodology for either
detecting or mitigating cyber attacks. However, this paper
is centralized on two basic conditions that help to address
this issue. The first is that detection and mitigation are two
processes that need to work together. And the second is that
the bandwidth of the control system plays a crucial role in the
speed of the DoS attack mitigation operation on hierarchical
controllers. Therefore, whatever the hierarchical controller or
strategy, the concern with these two issues is crucial to find
out robust countermeasure solutions to cyberattacks.
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